










The General Court’s Power to Alter EUIPO 





The contribution of Prof. Ottó Czúcz, who has become a personal friend over the years we 
were together as judges, to the development of the case-law of the General Court (GC) has 
been striking and has touched a panoply of EU law areas, as the different articles of this 
Volume clearly show. I have chosen, in this essay, to focus on a case which I find 
representative of both the innovative and cross-cutting nature of the jurisprudential 
developments to which Judge Czúcz has contributed as Judge-Rapporteur. In the judgment 
i‑content v OHIM — Decathlon (BETWIN), 1 the GC exercised for the first time its power to 
alter decisions of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO, formerly known 
as Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, OHIM), Boards of Appeal, granted by 
Article 65(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Regulation No 2015/2424, EU Trade Mark 
Regulation),
2
 applying the criteria established in this regard by the Court of Justice (Court) in 
Edwin Co. Ltd v OHIM.
3
 The judgment, therefore, represents a milestone for trade mark case 
law. However, its relevance reaches far beyond the specific subject-matter of the case: the 
theme of judicial alteration of EUIPO decisions speaks to the broader, and fundamental, 
issue of judicial supervision of administrative action. It is within this broader framework that 
Judge Czúcz’s contribution, and the case-law that followed, should be placed and analyzed 
to be better understood. Therefore, the present essay will be structured as follows: Section 1 
                                                          
*  President of the General Court. 
The views of the author are entirely personal and in no way portray a position of the General Court. 
1  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 4 June 2013, i-content Ltd Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v 
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) - Decathlon (BETWIN), 
Case T-514/11, EU:T:2013:291. 
2  The new Regulation on the European Union Trade Mark entered into force on March 23, 2016, with a few 
exceptions for some provisions to enter into force on October 1, 2017. The text of the Regulation was published in 
OJEU, 24.12.2015, L 341/21, Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2015 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, 
and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for Harmonization in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (Text with EEA relevance). 
3  Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 5 July 2011, Edwin Co. Ltd v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal 
Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case C-263/09 P, EU:C:2011:452. 
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will briefly address general questions on judicial review of administrative acts in the EU 
legal order; Section 2 will focus on the principle established by Edwin on the exercise of 
the power to alter EUIPO decisions, on the case-law of the GC subsequent to that judgment 
and on how the i‑content case gave for the first time a practical dimension to the Edwin 
criteria; Section 3 will discuss jurisprudential developments after i-content. Finally, it will 
draw a brief conclusion. 
 
 
1. Administrative power and judicial review 
 
As mentioned above, Judge Czúcz’s input on the issue of the GC’s power to alter OHIM 
decisions should be placed within the wider discourse on the relationship, and boundaries, 
between the administration’s discretionary power, on the one hand, and the role of judicial 
review, on the other. This relationship is, in turn, a matter of institutional balance.
4
  
Judicial review of administrative acts is, of course, a core element of any legal system 
based on the rule of law.
5
 An in-depth discussion of how this mechanism plays out in EU 
law is certainly beyond the scope of the present contribution.
6
 It will suffice to recall, here, 
how the debate on the role of the European judge in reviewing the Commission’s 
decisions in the field of competition remains heated, both among practitioners and 
academics.
7
 A particularly significant element of the dispute is the issue of the GC’s 
standard of review in cases involving complex economic assessments.
8
 Whether it is 
competition or trademark law, the discussion revolving around the intensity of the review, 
by the European judge, of acts being an expression of administrative discretion essentially 
boils down to a question of institutional balance. It appears useful, at this point, to clarify 
the concept of institutional balance and its relevance for issues of judicial review.
9
 
                                                          
4  See  FRITZSCHE, ALEXANDER: “Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in 
European Law” in Common Market Law Review (47) 2010, pp. 361–403. 
5  See CRAIG, PAUL: EU Administrative Law, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2012. pp. 250–251. 
6  For comprehensive analyses, see, e.g., CRAIG, PAUL: EU Administrative Law. Türk, Alexander Heinrich, 
Judicial review in EU law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2009. 
7  See, e.g., SCHWEITZER, HEIKE: “Judicial Reviewi in EU Competition Law”, in Lianos, Ioannis, Geradin, Damien 
(eds.) Handbook of European Competition Law : Enforcement and Procedure, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2013,  pp. 491–538. 
8  On which I have had the opportunity to express my views elsewhere, see JAEGER, MARC: “The Standard of 
Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Marginalisation of the 
Marginal Review?” in Journal of European Competition Law and Practice, (2) 2011. pp. 295–314. Another matter 
where I addressed the issue of the relationship between the EU judge and competition decisions is the judicial 
assessment of the fines imposed by the Commission in the context of infringements in cartel proceedings, see 
JAEGER, MARC: “Standard of review in competition cases: can the General Court increase coherence in the 
European Union judicial system?”, in Baume, Tristan, Oude Elferink, Edmon, Phoa, Pauline, Thiaville, 
Dominique (eds.) Today’s Multilayered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspectives, Liber Amicorum in honour 
of Arjen WH Meij, Uitgeverij Paris B.V., 2011. pp. 115–140. 
9  The principle of institutional balance has both a legal and a political dimension. In the present contribution, the 
principle is discussed only in its legal dimension. On this matter, see CRAIG, PAUL: EU Administrative Law pp. 
253–256., citing  CRAIG, PAUL: “Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment” in European Law Journal, (3) 1997 pp. 105–130,  LENAERTS, KOEN, VERHOEVEN, AMARYLLIS: 
“Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance”, in Joerges, Christian,  Dehousse, 
Renaud (eds.) Good Governance in Europe's Integrated Market, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 35–88., 
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The principle of institutional balance is a constitutional principle which was mentioned 
for the first time in the Meroni case,
10
 where the Court saw “in the balance of powers which 
is characteristic of the institutional structure of the community a fundamental guarantee 
granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings and associations of undertakings to 
which it applies”.
11
 Subsequently, in the judgment where the Court recognized to the 
Parliament standing to bring actions for annulment,
12
 the notion of institutional balance was 
further defined:  
 
“[t]hose prerogatives are one of the elements of the institutional balance created by 
the Treaties. The Treaties set up a system for distributing powers among the different 
Community institutions, assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional 
structure of the Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
Community. Observance of the institutional balance means that each of the institutions 
must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. It also 





In the context of judicial review of administrative action, should the Court go 




The link between judicial review of administrative action and the principle of 
institutional balance was recognized by Advocate General Tizzano in his Opinion in the 
Tetra Laval case, in the framework of a reflection on complex economic appraisals and 
the relative standard of judicial review. It was stressed, in this context, that “with regard to 
the complex economic assessments made by the Commission, review by the Community 
judicature is necessarily more limited, since the latter has to respect the broad discretion 
inherent in that kind of assessment and may not substitute its own point of view for that of 
the body which is institutionally responsible for making those assessments”. Therefore, 
“[t]he rules on the division of powers between the Commission and the Community 
judicature, which are fundamental to the Community institutional system, do not however 
allow the judicature to go further, and particularly … to enter into the merits of the 
                                                          
SMISMANS, STIJN: “Institutional Balance as Interest Representation. Some Reflections on Lenaerts and 
Verhoeven”, in Joerges, Christian,  Dehousse, Renaud (eds.) Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, 
pp. 89–108, JACQUÉ, JEAN-PAUL: “The Principle of Institutional Balance” in Common Market Law Review, 
(41) 2004, pp. 383–391. CRAIG, PAUL: “Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance”, in Craig, Paul, De 
Búrca, Grainne (eds.) The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press, 2011. pp. 41–84.  
10  Judgment of the Court of 13 June 1958, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of 
the European Coal and Steel Community, Case 9–56, EU:C:1958:7. 
11  Meroni, p. 152; see JACQUÉ : “The Principle of Institutional Balance” p. 384. FRITZSCHE: “Discretion, Scope of 
Judicial Review and Institutional Balance” p. 382, CRAIG, PAUL: EU Administrative Law. pp. 255–256. 
12  Judgment of the Court of 22 May 1990, European Parliament v Council of the European Communities, Case C-
70/88, EU:C:1991:373. 
13  European Parliament v Council, paras 21–22. See FRITZSCHE “Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and 
Institutional Balance” p. 303, CRAIG: EU Administrative Law pp. 254–255. 
14  FRITZSCHE: “Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance” p. 382. 
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Commission’s complex economic assessments or to substitute its own point of view for 
that of the institution”.
15
 
From this point of view, the relevance of the concept of institutional balance has been 
expressly recognized precisely in the context of the GC’s power to alter EUIPO decisions, 
where the GC has refused to exercise its power of alteration when it considered that the 
alteration of the EUIPO decision would have implied “in essence, the exercise of 
administrative and investigatory functions specific to OHIM” and would have, therefore, 




By its very nature, the power of the GC to alter OHIM decisions presents an inherent 
risk of overstepping the judicial role. It is the responsibility of the judge to understand 
whether the circumstances of the case ensure that the exercise of such alteration power 
does not amount to exercising “administrative and investigatory functions”, those being 
the domain of the administrative agency, and therefore that the institutional balance is 
not infringed. The establishment of criteria and the operation in practice of the GC’s 
power of alteration will be the focus of the following paragraphs. This analysis presents 
a particular interest also in that it allows to explore the relationship between the 






2. The case-law on the boundaries of the power of alteration of OHIM decisions: two 
seminal judgments, Edwin and i-content 
 
As is known, pursuant to Article 65 of EU Trade Mark Regulation,
18
 the GC has the 
power to annul or alter a decision of the Board of Appeal.
19
 When the GC exercises its 
                                                          
15  Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 25 May 2004, Commission of the European 
Communities v Tetra Laval BV, Case C-12/03 P, EU:C:2004:318 para 86–89. 
16  Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) of 14 December 2011, Völkl GmbH & Co. KG v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-504/09, ECR, 
EU:T:2011:739, para 121, see Dragos, Dacian, Neamtu, Bogdana (eds.), Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
European Administrative Law, Springer 2014, p. 523.   
17  See Decision 4 July 2005 in case R 22/2003-2, Junior Kit, see e.g. GEIGER, CHRISTOPHE: Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2015, p. 284. On Agencies 
in EU law, see BUSUIOC, MADALINA: European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability, Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
18  Council Regulation (EC) No 2015/2424 of 16 December 2015 on the EU Trade Mark.  
19  In particular, Article 65 of Regulation 2015/2424 provides:  
  “1. Actions may be brought before the General Court against decisions of the Boards of Appeal in relation to  
appeals. 
2. The action may be brought on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaty, of this Regulation or of any rule of law relating to their application or 
misuse of power. 
3. The General Court shall have jurisdiction to annul or to alter the contested decision. 
4. The action shall be open to any party to proceedings before the Board of Appeal adversely affected by its 
decision. 
5. The action shall be brought before the General Court within two months of the date of notification of the 
decision of the Board of Appeal. 
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power of alteration, “the Court’s decision replaces that of the Board”.
20
 This kind of 
power must be carefully exercised, as at the core of this type of judicial intervention lies 
the need for a correct understanding of the boundaries between administrative discretion 
and the role of the judge.  
  
 
2.1. The Edwin principle 
 
In Edwin, the Court clarified the scope of the power to alter EUIPO decisions and the 
criteria which must inspire the exercise of such power. The core of the Edwin approach can 
be summarized in three points. First, the Court recalled that the review that the GC carries 
out under what is now Article 65 of EU Trade Mark Regulation “is a review of the legality 
of the decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM”,
21
 and that the GC “may annul or alter a 
decision against which an action has been brought only if, at the time the decision was 
adopted, it was vitiated by one of the grounds for annulment or alteration set out”
22
 in 
paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned article. Second, and as a consequence, the Court 
stressed that “the power of the General Court to alter decisions does not have the effect of 
conferring on that Court the power to substitute its own reasoning for that of a Board of 
Appeal or to carry out an assessment on which that Board of Appeal has not yet adopted a 
position”.
23
  Third, “[e]xercise of the power to alter decisions must therefore, in principle, be 
limited to situations in which the General Court, after reviewing the assessment made by the 
Board of Appeal, is in a position to determine, on the basis of the matters of fact and of law 
as established, what decision the Board of Appeal was required to take”.
24
 Applying these 
principles to the case at issue, the Court recalled that the Board of Appeal had not ruled “on 
the effect which the alleged assignment of the trade mark at issue by contract to the appellant 
might have as regards the validity of that trade mark”.
25
 In light of this, the Court held that 





2. 2.The case-law after Edwin 
 
The Edwin case represented a crucial moment in that it consecrated the power of 
alteration, while at the same time defining its boundaries. The case-law immediately 
following Edwin shows that some adjustment time was needed for the criteria established 
therein to become fully operational.  
                                                          
6. The Office shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the General Court or, in the 
event of an appeal against that judgment, the Court of Justice.” 
20  SEE LENAERTS, KOEN, MASELIS IGNACE, GUTMAN KATHLEEN: EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
p. 714. 
21  Edwin, para 71. 
22  Ibidem. 
23  Ivi, para 72. 
24  Ibidem. 
25  Ivi, para 73. 
26  Ivi, para 74. 
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In Ergo Versicherungsgruppe v. OHIM,
27
 the GC annulled the decision of the Fourth 
Board of Appeal in so far as the Board of Appeal omitted to rule on the action brought 
before it as regards goods in one of the classes for which registration was sought. The 
EUIPO asked the GC to rule on the matter, on the basis of the assessment carried out by the 
Opposition Division, which required an exercise of its power of alteration. The GC 
considered that the possibility to alter the decisions of the Board of Appeal is limited to 
situations in which the case has reached a stage appropriate for judicial adjudication (para. 
23). The GC concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, the alteration of the contested 
decision would have meant, for the GC, to decide for the first time on the substance of the 
claims on which the Board of Appeal had failed to rule, which would go beyond the 
jurisdiction of the GC (para 24). While the case appears to be in line with Edwin, no 
reference is made to the latter in the judgment.  
Shortly afterwards, in Seven v. OHIM,
28
 the GC justified its decision not to exercise its 
power of alteration by expressly referring to the Edwin criteria. Applying such criteria to 
the case at issue, the GC held:  
 
“since the Board of Appeal based its decision solely on the lack of similarity between 
the signs at issue and rejected, for that reason alone, the two grounds on which the 
opposition was based, it is not for the Court, in the present case, to carry out an overall 
examination of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of 
Regulation No 207/2009, or to assess whether the other conditions of Article 8(5) of that 





In a subsequent judgment, Deutsche Bahn AG v OHIM,
30
 the GC seemed to go beyond 
the boundaries established with Edwin. In the case, the First Board of Appeal had 
dismissed the applicant’s appeal and had also rejected the opposition. The Board had 
considered that “the earlier marks and the mark applied for were descriptive of the 
services covered by the application for registration and that they had weak distinctive 
character, with the result that their ability to fulfil the function of indicating the 
commercial origin of those services was limited”. Moreover, the Board “took the view 
that the signs ICE, IC and IC4 were unlikely to be identified as trade marks and that, 
therefore, there could not be any likelihood of confusion between them” (para 16). 
Furthermore, the Board had endorsed the Opposition Division’s reasoning, according to 
which “the signs at issue could not be regarded as similar, which ruled out any likelihood 
of confusion” (para 13). The GC found that the Board of Appeal had erred in law in its 
main reasoning. However, given that the Board had expressly adopted the Opposition 
Division’s analysis of the likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, the GC 
                                                          
27  Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 9 September 2011, Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG v 
Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-382/09, 
EU:T:2011:454. 
28  Judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 October 2011, Seven SpA v Office for Harmonisation 
in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-176/10, EU:T:2011:577. 
29  Seven SpA, para 58. 
30  Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) of 9 September 2011, Deutsche Bahn AG v Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-274/09, EU:T:2011:451. 
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carried out its review on the basis of the Opposition Division’s assessment. The 
conclusion of the GC was the following: “the Board of Appeal erred in concluding that 
there was no likelihood of confusion between the IC4 and ICE trade marks. Consequently, 
the contested decision must be annulled, as, by virtue of the alteration of that decision, 
must the decision of the Opposition Division”.
31
 
It should be stressed that the GC has, in this occasion, adopted a position on an issue 
which the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal had considered not necessary to 
examine. In particular, the Opposition Division had stated that it was “superfluous to 
consider the distinctive character of the earlier marks and, in particular, to examine 
whether those earlier marks enjoyed a reputation in Germany”, since it had concluded that 
there was no similarity of any kind between the marks at issue. The GC, however, found, 
on the basis of the evidence presented by the applicant during the opposition proceedings 
and in support of the action before the GC itself, that the ICE trade mark had “a highly 
distinctive character in Germany as a result of its reputation” (para 96). Taking this factor 
into account, the GC held that the Board of Appeal had erred in concluding for the 
absence of any likelihood of confusion. In sum, in this case, the decision of the Board of 
Appeal was annulled and, by virtue of alteration of the latter, the decision of the 
Opposition Division was annulled; in its analysis, the GC adopted a position on an issue 
which had not been previously examined. It would therefore appear that the GC went 
beyond the boundaries established in Edwin. 
Finally, in the case Ben-Ri Electrónica, SA v OHIM,
32
 the Board of Appeal had 
concluded that no likelihood of confusion existed only on the basis of the analysis of the 
similarities between the signs at issue. The GC considered that it was necessary to 
examine whether the Board of Appeal was right in finding that the trade marks concerned 
presented no similarities capable of bringing about a risk of confusion. The GC concluded 
that the Board of Appeal had erred in considering that the signs were not similar and 
annulled the contested decision on that basis. The GC also held that it was for the EUIPO 
draw the consequences of the annulment of the decision, and that it was not for the GC to 
rule on the request to reject the application for trade mark registration. However, also in 
this case no reference to Edwin was made. 
 
 
2. 3. The principle put into practice for the first time: i-content 
 
I-content was first case where the GC actually exercised its power to alter EUIPO 
decisions, thus giving a practical dimension to the boundaries established in Edwin. Judge-
Rapporteur Otto Czúcz’s contribution to the adopted solution is apparent.  
In order to fully understand the reasoning developed in the judgment, it appears 
necessary, first of all, to describe the circumstances of the case. I-content applied for the 
registration of a trade mark (the word sign BETWIN) in respect of goods falling within, 
                                                          
31  Deutsche Bahn AG, para 101. 
32  Judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) of 10 November 2011. Ben-Ri Electrónica, SA v Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-143/10, 
EU:T:2011:652. 
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inter alia, Classes 25, 26 and 28 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International 
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of June 
1957. Decathlon filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark on the basis, in 
particular, of an earlier Community figurative mark, covering goods in Class 25 and 
“gymnastics and sporting articles (other than clothing, footwear and mats)” in Class 28.  
The Opposition Division upheld the opposition in part, rejecting the trademark 
application in respect of all the goods in Classes 25 and 28, while granting the application 
in respect of the goods in Class 26. The applicant challenged the decision, and the First 
Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed the appeal, endorsing the Opposition Division’s 
analysis as regards, inter alia, the identity of the goods in Class 25 covered by the mark 
applied for and the earlier mark and the identity or similarity between the goods in Class 
28 covered by the mark applied for and the earlier mark, the similarity between the signs, 
and the likelihood of confusion as regards the goods in Classes 25 and 28. The applicant 
sought annulment of the decision of the Board of Appeal before the GC. The action was 




The part of the reasoning of the GC which is worth underlining for present purposes 
concerns the issue whether, in essence, “sporting articles” and “games”, both in Class 28, 
could be considered similar. As regards the contested goods in Class 28, the Opposition 
Division had concluded that, since the earlier mark protected “gymnastics and sporting 
articles”, the goods covered by that mark were similar to all the goods covered by the mark 
applied for, which included also “toys, games and playthings”, because, according to the 
Opposition Division, these goods share the same purpose, the same distribution channels and 
the same end users. The applicant, however, maintained that there were substantial 
differences between “gymnastics and sporting articles (other than clothing, footwear and 
mats)”, covered by the earlier mark, and a category of articles consisting of toys, games and 
playthings, covered by the mark applied for. The GC stated that the two groups of goods 
could not be considered as similar, finding that the intended purpose of the two categories of 
goods is essentially different and that it cannot be concluded that they share the same 
distribution channels. As a consequence, the GC concluded that, contrary to the Opposition 
Division’s analysis endorsed by the Board of Appeal, the toys, games and playthings at issue 
were not similar to “gymnastics and sporting articles (other than clothing, footwear and 
mats)” covered by the earlier mark, and therefore found that the OHIM’s decision was 
vitiated by an error in this regard.  
As regards the likelihood of confusion, the GC held that there was no such likelihood 
as regards “toys, games and playthings”, whereas it concluded that, for the other goods 
belonging to Classes 25 and 28 covered by the marks at issue, it could not be ruled out that 
at least part of the public was likely to believe that such goods came from the same 
undertaking or from economically-linked undertakings. In conclusion, the applicant’s plea 
                                                          
33  Article 8(1)(b) provides: “Upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for 
shall not be registered … if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or 
similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of 
the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the 
likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”. 
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was to be upheld in respect of the goods falling under the category of toys, games and 
playthings, whereas his application for annulment was to be dismissed as to the remainder.  
Finally, the GC considered that the conditions for exercising its power of alteration of 
EUIPO decisions, as set out in the Edwin judgment, were satisfied. In particular, the GC 
concluded that the Board of Appeal was required to find that, contrary to the view of the 
Opposition Division, there was no likelihood of confusion in respect of the goods in Class 
28 which fell under the category of toys, games and playthings. The GC therefore held 
that it was necessary, by way of alteration of the contested decision, to annul the 
Opposition Division’s decision and to reject the opposition in relation to the above-
mentioned goods.  
This judgment, therefore, constitutes the first example of the exercise of the power to 
alter EUIPO decisions in application of the Edwin criteria. The conditions set out in Edwin 
were thus given a practical dimension, contributing to the demarcation of the boundaries of 
the power to alter. I-content is therefore a seminal judgment, representing a clear model of 
how to exercise such power without encroaching upon the administration’s sphere and, 
therefore, without improperly altering the above-mentioned institutional balance. In 
subsequent judgments, the GC built upon the foundations laid by i-content, and further 




3. After Edwin and i-content: further clarifications on the power to alter  
 
In Koscher + Würtz v OHIM,
34
 the GC further clarified the conditions and limits for the 
exercise of its power to alter EUIPO decisions. The possibility of amending the decision at 
issue was considered by GC as regards both pleas raised by the applicant, the first alleging 
an error of law on the part of the Board of Appeal in relation to Article 42(2) of EU Trade 
Mark Regulation,
35
 by allowing the opposition without examining whether the earlier mark 
had been put to genuine use, and the second claiming that there was no likelihood of 
confusion.  
As regards the first plea, the GC recalled that, as clarified in Edwin, Article 65(3) does 
not enable the European judge to review a question on which the Board of Appeal has not 
yet ruled. The GC therefore concluded that it could not carry out any assessment of 
genuine use of the earlier mark, since the Board of Appeal had not ruled on that point. 
                                                          
34 Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber) of 26 September 2014, Koscher + Würtz GmbH v Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case T-445/12, 
EU:T:2014:829. 
35 Article 42(2) of the Regulation provides: “If the applicant so requests, the proprietor of an earlier EU trade 
mark who has given notice of opposition shall furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the 
date of filing or the date of priority of the EU trade mark application, the earlier EU trade mark has been 
put to genuine use in the Union in connection with the goods or services in respect of which it is registered 
and which he cites as justification for his opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use, provided 
the earlier EU trade mark has at that date been registered for not less than five years. In the absence of 
proof to this effect, the opposition shall be rejected. If the earlier EU trade mark has been used in relation to 
part only of the goods or services for which it is registered it shall, for the purposes of the examination of 
the opposition, be deemed to be registered in respect only of that part of the goods or services”. 
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With regard to the absence of a likelihood of confusion, the GC concluded that the 
second plea in law had to be dismissed and that the order sought by the applicant for 
amendment of a decision had to be rejected. The GC added that, following examination of 
the genuine use of the earlier mark as a result of this judgment, it would be for EUIPO to 
make a new decision, if applicable, on the likelihood of confusion between the two 
conflicting marks, and that it would thus be for OHIM, when comparing the two marks, to 
draw the consequences of a potential lack of genuine use of the earlier mark for some of 
the goods covered. 
Subsequently, in the case Apple and Pear Australia Ltd and Star Fruits Diffusion v 
OHIM,
36
 the GC examined the power to alter in the context of a reflection on the 
principle of res judicata. At issue in the case was the opposition by Apple and Pear 
Australia Ltd and Star Fruits Diffusion concerning the registration of a trade mark, the 
word sign “English pink”, applied for by Carolus C. BVBA, on the basis of several 
earlier marks. The Opposition Division rejected the opposition, and the applicants 
challenged such decision. Subsequently, a national court, the Tribunal de commerce de 
Bruxelles, delivered a judgment pursuant to an action for infringement brought by the 
applicants, annulling the Benelux mark ENGLISH PINK and ordering Carolus C. to 
refrain from using that mark in the EU. The applicants provided the EUIPO with the 
judgment. Subsequently, the Fourth Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 
The GC examined the first and third pleas raised by the applicants. The first plea 
alleged infringement of the previous wording of Article 75 of EU Trade Mark 
Regulation,
37
 on the ground that the contested decision contained no statement of 
reasons as to the inferences to be drawn from the judgment of the Tribunal de commerce 
the Bruxelles. The third plea was based on the alleged infringement of the general principles 
of legal certainty, sound administration and protection of legitimate expectations. 
The GC found that the Board of Appeal had infringed, firstly, Article 75 of EU Trade 
Mark Regulation, as it had failed to refer, in the contested decision, to the existence of 
the judgment of the Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles and to the potential impact of 
that judgment for the outcome of the dispute. The Board of Appeal was also deemed to 
have infringed its duty of diligence in failing to assess with all the required care the 
relevant factual aspects submitted to it. In light of this, the GC annulled the contested 
decision. 
Subsequently, the GC went on to consider the head of claim seeking alteration of the 
contested decision. The applicant submitted, in support of the claim, that res judicata 
attached to the judgment of the Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles and was therefore 
binding on the Board of Appeal and, by extension, the GC as well. The latter, according to 
the applicant, was therefore able and required to alter the contested decision. Moreover, they 
stated that res judicata attaches not only to the operative part of a judicial decision, but also 
to the ratio decidendi, and referred in that regard to the unitary character of the Community 
                                                          
36 Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 25 March 2015, Apple and Pear Australia Ltd and Star 
Fruits Diffusion v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), Case 
T-378/13, EU:T:2015:186. 
37 In the Regulation 207/2009, Article 75 consisted of only one paragraph, which is now the first paragraph of the 
new Article 75, which consists of three paragraphs. 
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Trade Mark and the need to avoid contradictory decisions between the Community Trade 
Mark  courts and EUIPO. 
After recalling the Edwin jurisprudence, GC stated: 
 
 “[i]t is … clear that the decision of a national court sitting as a Community trade 
mark court in an action for infringement of a Community trade mark carries no such 
weight of res judicata for the departments of OHIM in opposition proceedings 
concerning the registration of a Community trade mark, even if it is identical to the 
national mark which is the subject of the action for infringement …. It follows that the 
existence of a decision such as that of the [Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles] in the 
present case, even if it has become final, is not in itself sufficient to enable the General 




In particular, the GC noted that the res judicata which attached to the national 
judgment is not binding either on the Board of Appeal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to 
rule on whether the mark can be registered, or on the EU Courts, in the exercise of their 
review of lawfulness and their power of alteration under Article 65(3) of Community 
Trade Mark Regulation.  
In conclusion, the GC recalled that the Board of Appeal had failed to take into account 
the national judgment and to assess the potential impact of that judgment on the outcome 
of the dispute at issue. Therefore, the GC considered that it was not in a position to 
determine, on the basis of the matters of fact and law as established, which decision the 
Board of Appeal was required to take and could not, as a consequence, exercise its power 






The GC’s power to alter decisions of the OHIM Boards of Appeal sits within the broader 
issue of the relationship between administrative power and judicial review. The exercise 
of such power, by which “the Court’s decision replaces that of the Board”,
39
 inherently 
presents the risk of going beyond the limits of judicial control. This excursus on the case–
law has shown, however, how the European judge, first in principle, with Edwin, then in 
practice, with i-content, has been able to guarantee that such delicate exercise of judicial 
review occurs in full compliance with the principle of institutional balance.  
I am happy that Otto Czúcz, as Judge-Rapporteur, has been able to take part in this 
significant development as regards the practical operation of this principle. In trade mark 
law, as in all areas of Union law, Judge Czúcz has, thanks to his invaluable academic and 
human qualities, made a crucial contribution to the development of EU law. 
 
 
                                                          
38  Apple and Pear Australia, para 57. 
39  LENAERTS, KOEN, MASELIS IGNACE , GUTMAN KATHLEEN: EU Procedural Law p. 714. 
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THE GENERAL COURT’S POWER TO ALTER EUIPO DECISIONS: 




This contribution focuses on the General Court’s power to alter decisions of the EUIPO 
Boards of Appeal, granted by Article 65(3) of Regulation No 2015/2424 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community trade 
mark, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs). This power sits 
within the broader issue of the relationship between administrative power and judicial 
review. The exercise of such power, by which the Court’s decision replaces that of the 
Boards of Appeal presents the risk of going beyond the limits of judicial control. This 
contribution examines the principle established by the Court of Justice in Edwin on the 
exercise of the power to alter EUIPO decisions, on the case-law of the GC subsequent to that 
judgment, on how the i‑content case gave for the first time a practical dimension to the 
Edwin criteria and on jurisprudential developments after i-content. 
 
